Distortion Agnostic Deep Watermarking by Luo, Xiyang et al.
Distortion Agnostic Deep Watermarking
Xiyang Luo1, Ruohan Zhan2∗ , Huiwen Chang1, Feng Yang1, and Peyman Milanfar1
1Google Research
2Stanford University
Abstract
Watermarking is the process of embedding information
into an image that can survive under distortions, while re-
quiring the encoded image to have little or no perceptual
difference from the original image. Recently, deep learning-
based methods achieved impressive results in both visual
quality and message payload under a wide variety of im-
age distortions. However, these methods all require differ-
entiable models for the image distortions at training time,
and may generalize poorly to unknown distortions. This is
undesirable since the types of distortions applied to water-
marked images are usually unknown and non-differentiable.
In this paper, we propose a new framework for distortion-
agnostic watermarking, where the image distortion is not
explicitly modeled during training. Instead, the robustness
of our system comes from two sources: adversarial training
and channel coding. Compared to training on a fixed set of
distortions and noise levels, our method achieves compara-
ble or better results on distortions available during training,
and better performance on unknown distortions.
1. Introduction
Digital watermarking [8] is the task of embedding infor-
mation into an image in a visually imperceptible fashion,
where the message can be reliably extracted under image
distortions. There are two key factors to measure the per-
formance of a digital watermarking system, imperceptibility
and robustness. Given an image and a message, a good wa-
termarking system produces an encoded image that is nearly
identical to the original image, while carrying a message
payload that will survive under a variety of distortions such
as cropping, blurrying, or JPEG compression. Traditional
approaches found creative ways of hiding information in
texture rich areas [5] or the frequency domain [16]. More
recently, convolutional neural networks (CNNs) have been
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Known Distortions Unknown Distortions
100.0 50.2 53.0 81.3 71.8 74.6 65.1 93.4 85.3 65.0
99.0 80.8 85.7 87.0 86.1 87.7 71.0 95.2 78.7 90.6
100.0 49.9 99.3 51.0 62.5 50.3 64.3 92.1 81.1 63.3
93.1 50.0 51.3 99.4 51.0 51.0 54.3 89.0 75.4 63.8
53.0 49.8 51.8 50.5 99.9 50.3 61.4 69.6 76.3 52.6
100.0 77.0 99.1 98.7 99.1 93.5 70.8 94.2 84.9 88.6
100.0 81.7 93.5 97.9 92.8 95.6 94.0 98.5 88.4 91.7
Figure 1: Bit accuracy of our model compared to models trained
with explicit image distortions. Each column corresponds to a type
of image distortion at test time, and each row corresponds to the
image distortion used to train the watermarking model (with the
exception of our model which requires no distortion model). The
left half of the columns (separated by the black line) are known
distortions, i.e., distortions included in training for the HiDDeN
combined model [45], and the right half of the columns unknown
distortions, i.e., a held-out set of commonly used distortions not
used to train the HiDDeN combined model. See Section 4.1 for
more details.
used to provide an end-to-end solution to the watermark-
ing problem. Zhu et al. [45] proposed HiDDeN, a unified
framework for digital watermarking and image steganogra-
phy.
Most CNN based watermarking methods explicitly
model the image distortions during training. However,
training on a specific image distortion can easily lead to
overfitting, and generalize poorly across other types of dis-
tortions [45]. This is undesirable since a practical water-
marking system should be robust towards a wide variety of
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Figure 2: Example of original image, encoded image and differ-
ence between the two images from our model.
image distortions, not only the ones included in training.
This can be mitigated by including a combination of dis-
tortions during training [45], but it requires carefully tuning
the type and magnitude of the distortions in order to reach
a good performance. Moreover, the problem of poor gener-
alization persists if the distortions at test time are far from
training.
To this end, we propose a framework for adding robust-
ness to a watermarking system without any prior knowl-
edge on the type of image distortions during training. We
achieve this by applying differentiable adversarial training
with CNN generated perturbations, and using channel cod-
ing to inject redundancy in the encoded message. To our
knowledge, this is the first paper explore distortion agnostic
methods for deep watermarking. Empirically, our model
achieves comparable performance on distortions known
during training, and generalization better to unknown dis-
tortions.
Our main contributions are the following.
• We apply adversarial training to improve model ro-
bustness in a distortion agnostic fashion. In particular,
our CNN generated adversarial examples implicitly in-
corporates a rich collection of image distortions that
co-adapt with training.
• We propose augmenting the watermarking system with
channel coding, adding an additional layer of robust-
ness through channel redundancy.
• We combine the two ideas above and achieve compa-
rable results to models trained with explicit distortion,
and better generalization to unknown distortions.
2. Related Work
There are three main areas of research relevant to this
work: watermarking, adversarial training, and channel cod-
ing. We give a brief review for each topic in the subsections
below.
2.1. Watermarking
Digital watermarking [8, 15, 5, 14, 24, 31, 34, 12] have
been an active research area with many important appli-
cations such as content copyright protection. More re-
cently, deep learning based approaches have been applied to
train an end-to-end watermarking system [45, 23, 1, 21, 43]
with impressive results. HiDDeN [45] was one of the
first deep learning solutions for image watermarking. Red-
Mark [1] introduced residual connections with a strength
factor for embedding binary images in the transform do-
main. Deep watermarking has since been generalized to
both video [39, 44] and audio [36]. Modeling more complex
and realistic image distortions also broadened the scope in
terms of application [40, 35].
There are several works that applied attacks to the en-
coded image when training the watermarking system. Mun
et al. [23] iteratively simulated attacks to the watermark-
ing system. RedMark [1] introduced an attack layer which
consists of random combinations of a fixed set of distor-
tions. However, these attacks are not adversarial since they
do not adapt with the watermarking model during training.
Recently, ROMark [38] applied a simple form of adversar-
ial training where the distortion type and distortion strength
are adaptively selected to minimize the decoding accuracy.
One key distinction of our method from the above is that
we do not generate our attacks from a fixed pool of common
distortions. Instead, the adversarial examples are generated
from a trained CNN. This also has the benefit that the water-
marking training is end-to-end differentiable, which is not
true for ROMark [38].
2.2. Adversarial Training
Deep neural networks are susceptible to certain tiny per-
turbations in the input space. Since the discovery of adver-
sarial examples by Szegedy et al. [33], a variety of methods
have been proposed for both adversarial attack [3, 17, 25],
and adversarial defense [11, 13, 27, 42]. One of the earliest
and most effective defense mechanism against adversarial
attacks is adversarial training [11], but is computationally
expensive on large datasets. Many attempts have since been
made to reduce the cost of adversarial training, e.g., using
approximations to the optimization step [27], or using gen-
erative models in place of iterative optimization [4, 18].
2.3. Channel coding
Channel coding is a mechanism for detecting and cor-
recting errors during signal transmission [6]. Shannon’s
capacity theorem [28] gives the theoretical limit to trans-
fer data through a noisy channel, and channel coding is
designed to approach this limit. In implementation, var-
ious classical methods such as the Reed-Solomon (RS)
codes [41], low-density parity-check (LDPC) codes [26],
turbo codes [32], and polar codes [37], have been widely
applied in the field of telecommunication. More recently,
learning based solutions have gained attention in this field
as well [2, 7, 9].
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Figure 3: Overview of proposed architecture. The input messageX is first fed through the channel encoder to produce a redundant message
X ′, which is then combined with the input image Ico to generate the encoded image Ien by the watermark encoder Fenc. The decoder Fdec
produces a decoded message X ′dec, where it is further processed by the channel decoder to produce the final message Xdec. The attack
network generates adversarial examples Iadv , which are fed to the image decoder to obtainX ′adv . Fenc, Fdec, are trained on a combination
of the image loss LI which includes both proximity to the cover image Ico and perceptual quality as in Equation 1, the message loss LM
as in Equation 2, and the message loss on the decoded adversarial message X ′adv as in Equation 4. The attack network Gadv is trained to
minimize the adversarial loss Ladv as in Equation 3. The training updates Gadv and the Fenc, Fdec in an alternating fashion.
Ien
Iadv
(a) blur (b) color and noise (c) blur and color (d) pattern (e) color
Figure 4: Visualization of adversarial examples generated by the attack network Gadv . Top: Encoded image Ien. Bottom: Adversarial
examples Iadv generated from the attack network Gadv . We observe a diverse set of image manipulations generated from the attack
network, consisting of a combination of blur, color change, and other types of distortions.
3. Proposed Method
3.1. Motivation
In designing a general purpose watermarking model, the
distortions at test time could be any image manipulation
that still preserves some image content. A typical solution
would involve identifying a set of representative distortions,
and applying a carefully tuned combination of distortions
during training.
Motivated by the recent success of using CNNs to per-
form various image manipulation tasks, e.g., style trans-
fer [10], HDRNet [19], we propose automating the distor-
tion tuning process by training a CNN to generate distor-
tions that exploits the weakest link in the current water-
marking model. Figure 4 shows some samples of distorted
images generated by our attack CNN, which contain a rich
and complex combination of distortions.
The use of channel coding is motivated by the idea of
injecting extra redundancy to the system. Shannon’s capac-
ity theorem tells us that redundancy is necessary in order to
achieve robustness. In the HiDDeN architecture, spatially
repeating the input message is an example of adding redun-
dancy. Channel coding simply provides another alternative
on top of the current methods.
3.2. Method Overview
Figure 3 gives an overview of our overall architecture.
Our method adds two key components on top of the water-
marking encoder / decoder networks Fenc and Fdec in [45]:
• We replace the distored image with Iadv , where Iadv is
an adversarial example generated from a convolutional
neural network trained to maximize the message loss.
• We replace the input message with a longer binary
message X ′ generated from channel coding.
3.3. Adversarial Training
Adversarial training generates distortions that co-adapt
with the training of our watermarking model, actively
strengthening the weakest point of the current model. Ad-
versarial training was first introduced by Goodfellow et
al. [11] as a method to defend against adversarial attacks.
In our context, adversarial training equates to minimizing
the message loss given the worst-case distortion in an -ball.
This is expressed as the following min-max problem,
min
Θenc,Θdec
max
‖δ‖≤
{LM (Fdec(Fenc(Ico; Θenc)+δ; Θdec), X)},
(1)
where Θenc,Θdec are the model parameters for watermark-
ing encoder/decoder networks Fenc, Fdec, and X is the
input message. Here we consider the L2 norm ‖ · ‖2 to
constrain δ, the perturbation to the encoded image Ien =
Fenc(Ico; Θenc). But more semantically meaningful mea-
sures such as L2 distance on VGG [30] activations could
also be used.
A direct optimization of Equation 1 is both computation-
ally expensive and overly restrictive for the watermarking
model. Instead, we relax Equation 1 by restricting the set
of distortions δ to be generated from some class of convo-
lutional neural network Gadv(I; Θadv).
min
{Θenc,dec}
max
{‖Gadv(Ien)−Ien‖≤}
{LM (Fdec(Gadv(Ien));X)}.
(2)
Using CNN generated adversarial examples have the benefit
of retaining the ability to generate a diverse set of image dis-
tortions, as shown in Figure 4. An alternative is to generate
the adversarial samples via the Fast Gradient Sign Method
(FGSM) as in [11]. But we found this yielded less diverse
examples compared to CNN generated examples, and re-
sulted in poorer overall robustness against distortion.
To train the attack network Gadv , we minimize the fol-
lowing adversarial training loss:
Ladv = α
adv
1 ‖Iadv − Ien‖2 − αadv2 LM (Fdec(Iadv);X),
(3)
where Iadv = Gadv(Ien) is the adversarial example, LM is
the message loss which we set as the L2 loss in this paper,
and αadv1 , α
adv
2 are the scalar weights. α
adv
1 controls the
strength of the distortion generated by the attack network
Gadv , while αadv2 controls the strength of the message loss
for Gadv .
For the network Gadv , we use a two-layer CNN,
Gadv(I) = Conv3 ◦ Leaky ReLU ◦ Conv16(I). (4)
In general, we find that finding the right balance of attack
strength, controlled by the complexity of Gadv and the ra-
tio between αadv1 and α
adv
2 , is important for training. An
overly strong attack results in slow training and a failure of
the watermarking network to adapt to the adversarial exam-
ples, while an overly simple attack results in less robustness
of the trained model. A detailed analysis can be found in
Section 4.3.
3.4. Channel coding
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Figure 5: Illustration of channel coding. Given an input mes-
sage X , the channel encoder produces a redundant message X ′ of
longer length. The redundant message X ′ is transmitted through
a noisy channel and received by the decoder as X ′no. Finally the
decoder recovers the input X from the corrupted message X ′no.
Channel coding provides an additional layer of robust-
ness through injecting redundancy to the system. Given
a binary message X ∈ {0, 1}D of length D, a channel
encoder produces a redundant message X ′ ∈ {0, 1}N of
length N > D, which can be used to recover X through
the channel decoder given reasonable amounts of channel
distortion to X ′, as shown in Figure 5.
In this paper, we generate a channel code X ′ from the
input message X , before passing X ′ to the watermarking
encoder as shown in Figure 3. The channel distortions in
this context are the errors from the watermarking model, be-
tween X ′ and X ′dec. Given that we do not explicitly model
the image distortions, it is impossible to know the true chan-
nel distortion model. Instead, we use a binary symmetric
channel (BSC) to approximate the channel distortion. BSC
is a standard channel model which assumes each bit is in-
dependently and randomly flipped with probability p. Even
though this assumption is not strictly satisfied in our case,
we find using BSC works well in this application.
Conceptually, any standard error correcting code such as
low-density parity-check (LDPC) codes [26] can be used to
generate X ′. However, traditional codes such as LDPC re-
quire the decoder to have an estimate of the channel noise
strength, which is impractical in our application since the
Figure 6: Channel noise strength versus decoder bit accuracy for
various redundant message lengths. The input message length is
fixed at D = 30, where the redundant message length N is varied
from 90 to 150. All models are trained on random binary input
with BSC noise. The training noise level is uniformly sampled
from [0, 0.3], and [0, 0.4] at test time.
noise strength can vary greatly from image to image. There-
fore, we use NECST [7], a learning based solution for joint
source and channel coding to cover a broad range of channel
distortion strengths. We use BSC for training the channel
model, where the input message X is randomly sampled,
and the channel noise strength is chosen from the interval
[0,maxstrength] uniformly at random. Figure 6 shows the
bit accuracy of the NECST model on a range of BSC chan-
nel noise.
We emphasize here that the channel coding model is not
jointly trained with the rest of the watermarking model.
This decoupling prevents the channel models from co-
adapting with the image models during training, which re-
sults in overfitting and less robustness across a wide spec-
trum of image distortions.
3.5. Watermarking Training and Losses
We give a detailed description of the algorithms for train-
ing the watermarking models. We first define the training
losses, using the same notations as in Figure 3.
Image loss
LI = α
I
1‖Ico − Ien‖2 + αI2LG(Ien) (5)
Message loss
LM = α
M‖X ′dec −X ′‖2 (6)
Attack network training loss
Ladv = α
adv
1 ‖Iadv − Ienc‖2 − αadv2 ‖X ′adv −X ′‖2 (7)
Watermarking training loss
LW = LI + LM + α
adv
W ‖X ′adv −X ′‖2 (8)
The image loss in Equation 5 consists of an L2 loss, and
a GAN loss LG with spectral normalization [22] to control
the perceptual quality of the encoded image. This is simi-
lar to the adversarial loss defined in the HiDDeN network
[45]. For the message loss LM , we use the L2 loss between
the decoded message and input. Equation 7 defines the loss
used to train the attack network Gadv . Finally, Equation 8
defines the overall loss for training Fenc and Fdec. The var-
ious αs are the weights for each loss. Training alternates
between updating the attack network Gadv and the water-
marking networks Fenc, Fdec, detailed in Algorithm 1.
Algorithm 1 Watermarking Training
1: procedure WATERMARKING TRAIN
Input: Ico, X ′ ∼ Unif({0, 1}N ).
Output: Trained networks Gadv, Fenc, Fdec.
Training Variables: Θadv,Θenc,Θdec.
2: while Step < max steps do
3: Compute Ien = Fenc(Ico, X)
4: for i = 1 to num iter do
5: Compute Iadv = Gadv(Ien)
6: Update Θadv = Θadv + lr × Adam(Ladv)
7: Update Θdec = Θdec + lr × Adam(LW )
8: Update Θenc = Θenc + lr × Adam(LW )
4. Experiments
For comparison, we train two versions of HiDDeN [45]
as the baseline, one without image distortion which we
name the identity model, and another trained on a combi-
nation of standard image distortions which we name the
combined model. We note here that our methodology is ag-
nostic to the specific architecture of the watermarking net-
works. We use the original HiDDeN architecture through-
out the experiments since it is a well studied model and a
commonly used benchmark, but other architectures such as
RedMark [1] could also be used as well.
We compare the bit accuracy on distortions seen dur-
ing training and those that have not, and also report the
peak signal-to-noise ratio (PSNR) of the encoded images.
All models are trained and evaluated on the MS COCO
dataset [20] resized to 128 × 128, where a random selec-
tion of 3000 images are used for evaluation. Unless other-
wise stated, we use D = 30 for the encoded message size,
and N = 120 for the redundant message size. For the wa-
termarking networks, we use the same architecture as used
in HiDDeN, with the exception that the embedded message
size is 120 instead of 30 due to the increased message length
from channel coding. Detailed training parameters can be
found in the supplementary materials.
4.1. Comparison with HiDDeN
We compare our method with both the HiDDeN iden-
tity and combined models. For the combined model, we
use JPEG (q = 50), dropout (q = 0.3), crop (p = 0.3),
Gaussian blur (σ = 1.0), where the JPEG distortion is ap-
Figure 7: Comparison of our model with HiDDeN identity model and combined noise model for different types of image distortions.
Model Identity Combined Ours
RGB- PSNR 40.3 32.3 33.7
Y- PSNR 47.5 34.2 35.7
U- PSNR 44.5 39.7 40.7
V- PSNR 43.1 39.5 40.1
Table 1: Comparison of encoded image quality. The PSNR values
in both RGB and YUV are reported for our model, as well as the
HiDDeN identity and combined distortion model.
proximated by the differentiable JPEG function [29]. We
also compare with specialized models trained only on a sin-
gle type of distortion with the noise levels in Figure 1. For
a fair comparison, we adjust αI1 to obtain a slightly higher
PSNR compared to the combined model, as shown in Ta-
ble 1.
Figure 1 shows the bit accuracy of our model and those
trained with explicit image distortion. Each row corre-
sponds to a different watermarking model, and each column
a specific type of distortion applied at evaluation time. The
top five rows (specialized models) clearly show a diagonal
pattern, indicating poor generalization to other types of im-
age distortions. From the bottom two rows, we see that both
the combined model and our adversarially trained model are
robust to distortions used to train the combined model (first
five columns).
Figure 7 gives a more comprehensive comparison across
a range of distortion levels. Our model reaches compara-
ble performance on crop and dropout, outperforms the com-
bined model on JPEG, and underperforms on Gaussian blur.
For small distortion strengths, our accuracy is nearly iden-
tical to the combined model. On all noise levels and dis-
tortion types, we outperform the identity model by a wide
margin.
In terms of visual quality, our model is less prone to
small artifacts in flat regions of an image. A qualitative
comparison can be found in Figure 11.
4.2. Generalization to Unknown Distortions
A practical watermarking system must be robust to a
wide range of image distortions, not just the distortions seen
during training. Therefore, we compare the performance
of our model and the combined model on a held-out set of
commonly used image distortions. To attain better cover-
age, we choose six types of distortions, i.e., saturation, hue,
resize, Gaussian noise, salt and pepper noise, GIF encoding
from four broad categories: color adjustment, pixel-wise
noise, geometric transformations, and compression. For
each type of distortion, we evaluate the models on three dif-
ferent values of distortion strengths. Figure 8 gives a visu-
alization of the additional distortions. We choose the range
of distortion strength strong enough to differentiate the per-
formance between different models, but in a regime where
the distorted image still resembles the original.
Table 2 reports the bit accuracy of our model on these ad-
ditional distortions. Overall, our model performs better on
the unknown distortions, especially on the category of color
change. We also note that the overall variance of bit accu-
racy across distortions is less compared to both the identity
and combined model, indicating a more stable performance
across different types of distortions. Furthermore, we see
that the performance gap of the combined model and the
Original Saturation (5.0) Hue(0.2) Resize (0.7)
GIF (16) S&P (0.05) Gaussian (0.06)
Figure 8: Visualization of additional image distortions.
Method Identity Combined Ours
Gaussian Noise (0.06) 74.6 93.5 95.6
Gaussian Noise (0.08) 67.7 87.2 93.5
Gaussian Noise (0.10) 63.2 80.4 89.5
Salt and Pepper (0.05) 99.1 97.2 95.7
Salt and Pepper (0.10) 93.1 89.4 85.0
Salt and Pepper (0.15) 83.4 79.6 77.1
Adjust Hue (0.2) 65.1 70.8 94.0
Adjust Hue (0.4) 34.0 45.3 70.7
Adjust Hue (0.6) 18.1 28.8 42.4
Adjust Saturation (5.0) 96.3 98.1 99.9
Adjust Saturation (10.0) 94.8 96.0 99.6
Adjust Saturation (15.0) 93.4 94.2 98.5
GIF (64) 87.1 96.5 97.6
GIF (32) 76.8 93.4 95.7
GIF (16) 65.0 88.6 91.7
Resize Width (0.9) 99.3 99.7 99.9
Resize Width (0.7) 85.3 84.9 88.4
Resize Width (0.5) 66.5 67.3 67.1
Average 78.37 84.26 88.30
Table 2: Comparison of our model with HiDDeN identity model
and combined noise model on additional image distortions. We
report the bit accuracy of our model, the HiDDeN combined and
identity model. When computing the average, results lower than
50% are truncated to 50% since they are no better than random
chance.
identity model shrinks on these unknown distortions, which
aligns with the intuition that generalization issue persists
even when training with a combination of distortions.
4.3. Detailed Analysis
4.3.1 Ablation Study
Table 3 reports the individual effect of channel coding and
adversarial training. We see that adversarial training con-
tributes to a large portion of the model robustness, while
channel coding further boosts performance in terms of ac-
curacy. Table 3 also shows that channel coding alone does
not provide enough robustness without a robust watermark-
ing model. However, combined with adversarial training
channel coding further boosts the performance of the wa-
termarking system especially if the bit accuracy is already
high.
JPEG
(Q=50)
Crop
(p=0.09)
Blur
(σ=1.0)
Dropout
(p=0.3)
Identity 50.2 53.0 59.6 81.3
Channel 51.3 60.5 50.2 90.3
Adv. 85.0 90.6 86.2 95.0
Both 81.7 93.5 92.8 97.9
Table 3: Model ablation study. We report the bit accuracy for
models trained with only channel coding, only adversarial train-
ing, both, and the identity model. For models trained with only
adversarial training, the input message length to the watermarking
model is 30 instead of 120.
4.3.2 Attack Complexity
We study the effect of varying the complexity and architec-
ture of the attack network Gadv . On top of adjusting the
network size and depth, we also consider two variants of
the attack network: the residual network (Res) where we
add a skip connection from the input, and a capped network
(Capped) where we limit the maximum pixel difference by
setting Gadv(I) = I +  tanh(CNN(I)). We also report
the results from the fast gradient sign method (FGSM) for
completeness.
JPEG
(Q=50)
Dropout
(p=0.3)
Blur
(σ=1.0)
Acc.
(adv.)
Conv (3,16) 81.7 97.9 92.8 90.6
Conv (3,32) 80.5 98.0 84.9 78.7
Conv (3,32,32) 75.0 95.3 81.5 72.0
Res (3,16) 84.5 96.3 86.3 95.0
Capped (0.03) 57.3 93.9 77.3 96.5
Capped (0.06) 53.2 94.6 78.1 99.5
FGSM 50.1 86.2 50.1 98.0
Table 4: Performance when varying attack network complexity.
Each row corresponds to models trained with a different config-
uration of attack network. The first three columns show the bit
accuracy on various image distortions. The last column shows the
bit accuracy on adversarial message X ′adv .
From Table 4, we observe that the bit accuracy on the
adversarial example decreases as the attack network com-
plexity increases, causing a slight degradation in the fi-
nal result. Capping the attack network yielded poor re-
sults on JPEG and Gaussian blur, indicating that this ap-
proach over-restricts the attack network. The residual net-
Original
HiDDeN
Ours
Diff (HiDDeN)
Diff (Ours)
Figure 9: Samples of encoded and cover images for the watermarking algorithm. First row: Cover image with no embedded message.
Second row: Encoded image from HiDDeN combined distortion model. Third row: Encoded images from our model. Fourth row:
Normalized difference of the encoded image and cover image for the HiDDeN combined model. Fifth row: Normalized difference for our
model.
work yielded very similar performance to the regular convo-
lutional model, slightly underperforming on Gaussian blur.
Finally, FGSM yielded poor results on all of the distortions,
since the image networks quickly overfits to this specific
type of distortion.
5. Conclusion
We propose a distortion agnostic watermarking method
that does not explicitly model the image distortion at train-
ing time. Our method consists of two core components, ad-
versarial training and channel coding, to improve the robust-
ness of our system. Compared with conventional methods
of improving model robustness, our methods do not require
the explicit modeling of the image distortions at training
time. Through empirical evaluations, we validate that our
model reaches comparable performance to the combined
distortion model on distortions seen during training, and
better generalization to unseen distortions. In future work,
we would like to improve upon our current methodology
to further increase model robustness, and explore deeper
the connections between watermarking and adversarial at-
tacks.
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6. Appendix
6.1. Training Details
We list the hyper-parameters used for training the watermarking model. For our model, we set αI1 = 18.0, α
I
2 =
0.01, αM = 0.3, αadv1 = 15.0, α
adv
2 = 1.0, α
adv
W = 0.2, and num iter = 5. For the HiDDeN combined model and
identity model, we set αI1 = 6.0, α
I
2 = 0.01, α
M = 1.0. The message size for our watermarking model is 120 instead of
30, due to the addition of the channel coding layer. We use the same network architecture as in HiDDeN. Namely, the input
image Ico is first processed by 4 3 × 3 Conv-BN-ReLU blocks with 64 units per layer. This is then concatenated along the
channel dimension with an H ×W spatial repetition of the input message. The combined blocks are then passed to two
additional Conv-BN-ReLU blocks to produce the encoded image. For the encoder, we symmetrically pad the input image
and use ’VALID’ padding for all convolution operations to reduce boundary artifacts of the encoded image. The encoded
image is clipped to [0, 1] before passing to the decoder. The decoder consists of seven 3× 3 Conv-BN-ReLU layers of size,
where the last two layers have stride 2. A global pooling operation followed by a fully-connected layer is used to produce
the decoded message.
For both our model and the combined model, the training warm-starts from a pre-trained HiDDeN identity model and
stops at 250k iterations. We use ADAM with a learning rate of 1e− 3 for all models.
For the channel model, we use a two fully connected layers with 512 units each, and train with BSC noise where the noise
strength is uniformly sample from [0, 0.3].
6.2. Encoded Image Samples
Original Ours Diff (Ours) Combined Diff (Combined)
Figure 10: Samples of encoded image from HiDDeN and our model.
6.3. Adversarial Example Samples
Original Ours Diff (Ours) Combined Diff (Combined)
Figure 11: More samples of encoded image from HiDDeN and our model.
Encoded Image Adversarial Example Difference
Figure 12: Samples of adversarial examples generated by the attack network.
